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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ANTI-BIAS CRIME LEGISLATION AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT-SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS WISCONSIN'S
PENALTY ENHANCEMENT LAW, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct.

2194 (1993).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Tampa, Florida, two white men poured gasoline over a black
tourist, stated "you're a nigger and you're going to die," and then
set him afire.' In Wilmington, North Carolina, three Marines dragged
a homosexual out of a bar and beat him while yelling "Clinton must
pay" and "[a]ll you faggots will die." '2 In La Habra, California,
attackers yelled racial slurs at a black woman as they pounded her
head into the pavement of a mall parking lot while one of her children
and several shoppers looked on.' These types of crimes, known as
hate or bias crimes, 4 are not uncommon in the United States. 5
A bias crime has been defined as one in which a perpetrator
intentionally acts against a person or property on the basis of the
victim's actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin,
ethnicity, sex, sexual origin, or disability. 6 In response to the

1.Frank Bruni & Constance C. Prater, Racist Torching Haunts the Nation:
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 18, 1993, at
9A. Fortunately, the victim survived the attack. Id.
2. 3 Marines Arrested for Beating Gay at Bar, Cm. TRm., Feb. 2, 1993, at
3. After the attack the Marines reportedly said that they hated all "faggots,"
wished that all homosexuals were dead, and that they were not ashamed of what
they did. Id.
3. Jodi Wilgoren, Senseless Violence Leaves Its Deadly Mark on O.C., Los
ANGELES TIMEs, O.C. EDITION, Dec. 28, 1993, at 10A. The victim subsequently

Black Victim Faced Angry Young Whites,

died of a heart attack. Id.
4. The term bias is used throughout this note, but bias and hate are inter-

changeable for the purposes of this piece.
5.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON
CRiMEs (1993). This report compiled data provided by 2,771 law enforcement
agencies on incidents of crimes motivated by bias in 1991. Of those reported,
62.3% of the crimes were motivated by race, 19.3% were motivated by religion,
9.5% were motivated by ethnicity, and 8.9% were motivated by sexual orientation.
Id. at 4. The Klanwatch Project of Alabama issued a report on bias motivated
crimes for 1992 noting that these crimes are not restricted to one particular group
or region, rather they occur throughout the United States and affect all racial
groups. Terry Box, Increasingly, Whites Targeted by Blacks: Group Finds New
HATE

Type of Hate Crime,

DALLAS MORNING NEWS,

May 4, 1993, at 5A.

6. H.R. 3355, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2409(a) (1993). This proposal would
direct the U.S. Sentencing Commission to increase sentences by approximately onethird for crimes motivated by hate or prejudice. Id.
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perceived harms caused by bias crimes, 7 the federal government8 and most states 9 have enacted some form of anti-bias crime
legislation. Generally, there are four types of anti-bias crime laws:
penalty enhancement laws,' 0 pure bias crime laws," ethnic intimidation or malicious harassment laws,' 2 and laws that prohibit the
placement or desecration of religious objects and other various emblems."'

7. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Jewish Advocacy Center in Support of Petitioner,
LEXIS, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) (No. 92-515). Bias crimes
are believed to create specific harms to society. First, they cause harm not just to
the individual victim, but to the group that the individual represents as a whole.
As a result, the entire group feels intimidated, threatened, and vulnerable to random
acts of violence. This, in turn, often creates retaliatory crimes by the "victimized"
group. Id. Second, there is evidence that bias crimes involve excessive violence
compared to nonbias crimes. Amicus Curiae Brief of the California Association
of Human Rights Organizations et al. in Support of Petitioner, LEXIS, Wisconsin
v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) (No. 92-515).
8. See, e.g., Federal Sentencing Guidelines § 2HI.1. The background comment
states that this section applies to intimidating activity by hate groups and authorizes
increased maximum terms of imprisonment.
9. For an excellent examination of the various types of bias crime laws enacted
in each state, see ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, HATE CRIMES LAWS: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE (1994).
10. Penalty enhancement laws provide enhanced sentences for crinjinal acts
motivated by bias. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.085 (West 1992); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 730, para. 5-5-3.2(a)(10) (Smith-Hurd 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5222 (1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 651:6(I)(g) (Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1455 (Supp. 1993); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 939.645 (West Supp. 1993).
11. Pure bias crime laws provide for punishment of bias motivated acts that
interfere with a person's civil rights. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West
Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-37a (West 1985); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 729A.2 (West 1993); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 470A (Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.2231 subd. 4 (West Supp. 1994); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 207.185
(Michie Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-14-04 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-17-309 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.3 (Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-42.1 (Michie 1992); W. VA. CODE § 61-6-21 (1992).
12. Ethnic intimidation laws punish acts of bias motivated intimidation. See,

e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-121 (West Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 265, § 39 (West 1990); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.147b (West 1991);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 574.090 (Vernon Supp. 1993); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2927.12
(Anderson 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.165 (1985); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2710 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-42-3 (1993).
Malicious harassment laws punish acts of bias motivated harassment. See, e.g.,
IDAHO CODE § 18-7902 (1987); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.31 (McKinney 1989); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.080 (West Supp. 1994). For laws that prohibit both ethnic
intimidation and malicious harassment, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-221 (1993);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 850 (West Supp. 1994).
13. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3112.2 (1989) (prohibiting the placement
or display of any "sign, mark, symbol, emblem, or other physical impression,
including but not limited to a Nazi swastika or ... a burning cross" with the
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In 1992 the validity of state anti-bias crime legislation became
uncertain when the Supreme Court decided R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, Minn.'4 In 1990, Robert A. Viktora and accomplices constructed and burned a cross inside the fenced yard of a black family. 5
Viktora was charged with violating the St. Paul ordinance which
prohibited the placement, on public or private property, of any
symbol or object that would arouse anger, alarm, or cause resentment
6
in another on the basis of certain characteristics, such as race.
In invalidating the ordinance as unconstitutional,' 7 the Court
accepted the Minnesota Supreme Court's construction of the statute
as applying only to "fighting words"' 8 and held that such a regulation
may not be selectively imposed based on the message sought to be
conveyed.' 9 The Court stated that a prohibition on fighting words

intent to deprive any person of her civil rights or with the intent to "intimidate,
threaten, abuse or harass" any person); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-37 (Harrison 1992)
(prohibiting the burning of a cross or other symbol); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3311 (West 1982) (prohibiting the placement of a symbol, object, characterization,
appellation or graffiti "including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi
swastika" that would expose another to violence or hatred "on the basis of race,
color, creed or religion"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-12.12 (1993) (prohibiting the
placement of a burning or flaming cross with the intent to intimidate); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-53-2 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-7-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (prohibiting
the burning or desecration of "a cross or other religious symbol" or placement
or display of "a sign, mark, symbol, emblem, or other physical impression, including
but not limited to a Nazi swastika").
14. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). There has been much scholarly work on R.A. V.
and the issue of the constitutionality of prohibitions on bias crimes. In support
of bias crime laws, see David Chang, Lynching and Terrorism, Speech, and R.A. V.:
The Constitutionality of Wisconsin's Hate Crimes Statute, 10 N.Y.L. ScI. J.Hum.
RTs. 455 (1993); Grannis, Note, Fighting Words and Fighting Freestyle: The Constitutionality of Penalty Enhancement For Bias Crimes, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 178
(1993). But see Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put you in Jail, But Can
Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic
Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L. REV. 333 (1991).
15. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
16. Id. The St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance provided:
Whoever places on public property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, included but not limited to, a burning cross or
Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion, or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Id. (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
17. Id. at 2542.
18. Id. Fighting words are "those which by their very utterance" injure or
incite immediate breach of the peace. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942); see infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
19. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542 (stating that the ordinance attempted to prohibit
"otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses").
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must proscribe the manner of expression, not the expressed thought
itself, in order to withstand constitutional challenge. 20
After this ruling, states were faced with the question of whether
they could constitutionally punish bias crimes without violating the
First Amendment. 2' In 1993, the Supreme Court resolved much of
the concern relating to the constitutionality of penalty enhancement
laws for bias crimes in Wisconsin v. Mitchell.2 When analyzing the
defendant's First Amendment rights, the Court upheld the Wisconsin
penalty enhancement provision 23 as constitutional 24 and found that
R.A. V. was not controlling. 25
To facilitate understanding of why the Mitchell Court reached
its holding, development of First Amendment theories and case law
is discussed first in the historical section of this note. Then, the
evidentiary use of speech to prove motive and the corresponding

20. Id. at 2548-49. The St. Paul ordinance prohibited any manner used to
express a message of hatred concerning race, gender, or religion as opposed to

prohibiting those fighting words which are expressed in a particular manner (i.e.,
an offensive or threatening manner). Id. at 2549.
21. See, e.g., State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 1992), vacated and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 2954 (1993) (invalidating Ohio ethnic intimidation law); State
v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Wisconsin v. Mitchell,
113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993). But see, e.g., In re Joshua H., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1993) (upholding California penalty enhancement law); People v. Miccio,
589 N.Y.S.2d 762 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1992) (upholding New York bias crime law);
Dobbins v. State, 605 So. 2d 922 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992), aff'd 631 So. 2d 303

(Fla. 1994) (upholding Florida penalty enhancement law); People v. Mulqueen, 589
N.Y.S.2d 246 (Nassau County 1st Dist. Crim. Ct. 1992) (upholding New York bias
crime law); State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558 (Or. 1992), cert. denied sub nom.
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2967 (1993) (upholding Oregon ethnic intimidation
law); State v. Hendrix, 813 P.2d 1115 (Or. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied sub nom.
Hendrix v. Oregon, 113 S. Ct. 2966 (1993) (upholding Oregon ethnic intimidation
law); People v. Grupe, 532 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1988) (upholding New

York bias crime law).
22. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
23. Id. at 2197 n.l. The pertinent part of the Wisconsin statute at the time of

Mitchell's conviction provided that the penalties for an underlying crime are increased
if a person:
Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime is committed or
selects the property which is damaged"or otherwise affected by the crime
... because of the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation,
national origin or ancestry of that person or the owner or occupant of

that property, whether or not the actor's belief or perception was correct.
Id. (quoting Wis. STAT. § 939.645 (1989-1990)). This statute was amended in 1993
but the amendments were, not at issue.
24. Id. at 2202 (holding that the defendant's First Amendment rights were not
violated).
25. Id. at 2200-01 (stating that R.A.V. only applies to laws that discriminate
between acts on the basis of their expressive content).
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punishment of acts motivated by bias in both criminal law and civil
anti-discrimination laws are examined.

II.

FACTS

On October 7, 1989, 19 year old Todd Mitchell incited a group
26
of young black men to severely beat a 14 year old white male.
Mitchell and the group were at an apartment complex in Kenosha,
Wisconsin, when the topic of conversation turned to a scene from
the movie "Mississippi Burning" in which a young black boy was
beaten by a white man.2 7 The group moved outside the apartment
complex and Mitchell asked: " '[Y]ou all feel hyped up to move
on some white people?' ",28 At Mitchell's direction the group attacked
Gregory Reddick, a young white male, who was walking on the
opposite side of the street from Mitchell and the group. 29 In the
course of the assault, Reddick was knocked to the ground, severely
beaten, and robbed. 30
Mitchell was convicted of aggravated battery and theft and
sentenced to four years imprisonment. 3' Although conviction of this
32
offense normally carries a sentence of two years imprisonment,
because the jury found that Mitchell chose his victim because of
his victim's race, Mitchell was sentenced to an additional two years
33
under the Wisconsin penalty enhancement statute.
On appeal, Mitchell argued that the penalty enhancement provision violated his First Amendment rights because it punished his
protected thoughts. 34 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected Mitchell's First Amendment challenge and upheld the penalty enhancement
provision. 3 On further appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed

26. Id. at 2196-97.
27. Id. at 2196.
28. Id.

29. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 809 (Wis. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Wisconsin
v. Mitchell, 113 S.Ct. 2194 (1993). Mitchell said, "You all want to . .. [expletive]
somebody up? There goes a white boy; go get him." Id. Mitchell then counted
to three and pointed at Reddick. Id.
30. Id. Reddick remained in a coma for four days. The record indicates that
his injuries may have resulted in permanent brain damage. Id.
31. Id. Mitchell was charged and convicted under Wis. STAT. §§ 939.05 and
940.19(lm) (1989-1990). Id.
32. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 809; see Wis. STAT. §§ 940.19(lm) and
939.50(3)(e) (1989-1990).
33. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2197; see supra note 23 for the text
of the statute.
34. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 811.
35. State v. Mitchell, 473 N.W.2d I (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
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the Court of Appeals in a five to two decision3 6 and struck down
7
the statute on the grounds that it violated the First Amendment.1
The Wisconsin Supreme Court cited R.A.V. in support of its
holding invalidating the Wisconsin statute on First Amendment
grounds3 8 and stated that the penalty enhancement provision was
invalid because it directly punished the defendant's constitutionally
protected thoughts.3 9 The court also found that punishment of Mitch-

ell's biased motive for selecting his victim was an unconstitutional

violation of Mitchell's First Amendment freedoms. 40 In addition, the

court distinguished permissible anti-discrimination laws from the
Wisconsin penalty enhancement provision 4' and held that the provision was overbroad 42 because it would impermissibly chill free
43
speech.
The two dissenting justices concluded that the statute punished
conduct, namely discriminatory selection, not protected expression,
and, therefore, R.A.V. did not control." The dissenters also stated
that the statute was not overbroad 45 and that use of the defendant's
speech to circumstantially prove intentional discriminatory selection

36. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 807 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
37. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W. at 811 (stating that the statute violated the
First Amendment directly by punishing "offensive" thought and indirectly by chilling
free speech).
38. Id. at 814-15 (stating that the Wisconsin statute and the St. Paul ordinance
both targeted the biased message conveyed).
39. Id. at 815. The court rejected the state's position that the statute only
punished conduct, the intentional selection of a victim, and stated that this literal
reading of the statute did not preclude the court from analyzing its practical effect.
Id.
40. Id. at 812 (relying on Gellman's theory, see supra note 14, at 363-68, that
motive is not constitutionally punishable, the court stated that "Itihe statute punishes
the 'because of' aspect of the defendant's selection, the reason the defendant
selected the victim, the motive behind the selection").
41. Id. at 816-17. The court reasoned that anti-discrimination laws punish
objective acts while a penalty enhancement provision penalizes the subjective mental
process of selecting a victim because of his protected status. Id.
42. Id. at 815 (quoting Bachowski v. Salamone, 407 N.W.2d 533, 539 (Wis.
1987)) (stating that overbroad laws tend to deter people from exercising their
constitutionally protected rights because they include permissible activity within their
scope).
43. Id. at 815-16. The court, again relying on Gellman, supra note 14, at 36061, stated that because the penalty enhancement provision allowed the use of speech
to prove that the defendant was motivated by bias when he intentionally selected
his victim, use of the defendant's words in this way would punish protected speech
and result in a chilling effect that would prevent people from expressing themselves
for fear of future prosecution under the statute. Id.
44. Id. at 819 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting); id. at 821 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 821 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
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of the victim would not produce a chilling effect.46 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari 47 and unanimously held that the
48
Wisconsin penalty enhancement provision was constitutional.

III.
A.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Government Regulation and Constitutional Protection of
Speech
In 1789, the importance of free speech was recognized when

the First Amendment was added to the United States Constitution:
49
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech."
Various theories have been offered to explain the significance of
the First Amendment guarantee of the freedom of speech.5 0 Originally,
support for this freedom was closely linked to the search for political
truth. For example, in 1927, Justice Brandeis asserted that the
freedom to form one's opinion and to speak one's mind about that
opinion was a "means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth."'" Another early proponent of free speech, Justice
Holmes, advanced the "market place of ideas" theory for protection
of speech in Abrams v. United States. 2 Justice Holmes based his
theory on the premise that the truth of any idea, not necessarily a
political one, is determined by the power of that idea to get itself
accepted in the marketplace of competing ideas. 3 A more modern

46. Id. at 819 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (stating that the provision chilled
lawless conduct and that only the beliefs or speech of the defendant that directly
related to the offense charged were relevant); id. at 822 (Bablitch, J., dissenting)
(stating that "[i]t is no more chilling of free speech to allow words to prove the
act of intentional selection ... than it is to allow a defendant's words that he
'hated John Smith and wished he were dead' to prove a defendant intentionally
murdered John Smith").
47. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 810 (1992). The Court cited the existing
conflict among state courts on the constitutionality of similar penalty enhancement
statutes among its reasons for granting certiorari. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct.
2194, 2198 (1993).
48. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2202.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. Constitutional protection of First Amendment freedoms also extends to state laws and regulations. Gitlow v. New York, 628 U.S.
652, 666 (1925) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protects First Amendment freedoms against state infringement).
50. For a more thorough analysis of the philosophies underlying the First
Amendment, see generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 16, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1004-06 (1987).
51. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
52. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
53. Id. "[Tihat the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market." Id.

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:659

free
theory offered in support of the First Amendment considers
4
speech to be vital to individual self-fulfillment and growth.1
Regardless of which theory one subscribes to, the First
Amendment right of free speech has been recognized as the foundation
for all other constitutionally guaranteed freedoms." Thus, while the
First Amendment guarantee initially pertained to political speech,
constitutional protection has also been extended to areas of speech
outside the political realm.5 6 In recognition of the importance of
free speech to society, the Supreme Court has stated that "above
all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
'5 7
matter, or its content.
1. Content-Based Regulation of Speech
Legislation aimed at censoring, punishing or discriminating against
communication because of its content" is subject to strict scrutiny5 9
and will most likely be struck down as violating the First Amendment 0

54. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1971).
55. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Justice Cardozo identified free
speech as "the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom."
Id. at 327.
56. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephriam, 452 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1981)
(recognizing that movies, radio and television programs, and live entertainment are
protected by the First Amendment); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
501-02 (1952) (stating that movies are protected by the First Amendment).
57. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S 92, 95 (1972) (citations omitted).
58. The following example illustrates the difference between content-based and
content-neutral regulation of speech. A law prohibiting marches for the purpose
of celebrating gay pride is content-based because it proscribes the content of the
communication; its purpose is to prevent the communication of the message of
gay pride. Conversely, a law regulating the hours of the day in which any march
not the content; the content of the march here is irrelevant. For further examples
of permissible and impermissible regulation of speech, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE &
RALPH S. TYLER, JR., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-3, at 797-804 (2d ed.
1988).
59. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S.Ct. 501
(1991). The government must show that the content-based regulation of speech
serves a compelling interest and that it is narrowly tailored to meet that end. Id.
at 509 (quoting Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231
(1987)).
60. Id. at 508 (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984)).
'Regulations which permit the government to discriminate on the basis of the
content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment.' " Id.;
see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992) (stating
that content-based regulations of speech are presumptively invalid); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971) (holding that speech cannot be prohibited simply
because the ideas expressed offend or insult).
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Thus, while reasonable time, place and manner regulations of speech
are permitted, 6' regulations which discriminate based on the message
62
to be conveyed are content-based and generally prohibited.
Nevertheless, the First Amendment guarantee does not protect
every conceivable statement or action. 63 The Court has held that
some kinds of speech may be constitutionally prohibited while others
are entitled to less than full protection.6 As the Court stated in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,65 "[tihere are certain well defined
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment
of which have never been thought to raise constitutional problems."66
For example, "fighting words," ' 67 fraud, 6 and obscenity 69 are classes
70
of speech which receive virtually no First Amendment protection,

61. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (explaining that reasonable
time, place and manner restrictions on speech are permitted so long as the restrictions
are content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve an important governmental interest,
and provide for alternative means of communication).
62. See, e.g., R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542; Simon & Schuster, Inc., 112 S. Ct.
at 508; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 23. The following regulations have been held to be
impermissibly content-discriminatory: prohibiting desecration of the American flag,
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410-20 (1989); prohibiting the wearing of armbands
to protest the Vietnam War, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 510-11 (1969); prohibiting labor picketing, Police Dept. v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 101-02 (1972).
63. As Justice Holmes stated in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919), "The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic."
64. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
293 (1984) (holding that expression, through speech or conduct, may be subject
to reasonable time, place, and manner regulations); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (holding that an important governmental interest may justify
regulation of expressive conduct).
65. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
66. Id. at 571-72.
67. Id. at 572 (holding that fighting words, those "which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace," are not protected
by the First Amendment because such words are of little social value in the search
for truth and constitute "no essential part of any exposition of ideas") (emphasis
added); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2545 (1992).
68. Cf. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (stating that frauds are
punishable by law); In re American Continental Corp., 794 F. Supp. 1424, 1448
(D. Ariz. 1992) (stating that the First Amendment does not protect fraud or
misrepresentation); Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 783 F. Supp. 233, 243 (D. Md.
1992) (stating that fraud is not protected under First Amendment), aff'd, 991 F.2d
1195 (4th Cir. 1993).
69. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957).
70. However, regulation of these categories of speech must be content-neutral
unless it falls into one of the three exceptions to the rule against content-based
regulation. See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545-49.
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while other classes of speech, such as defamation7 1 and commercial
speech,7 2 receive minimal constitutional protection.
2.

The Difference Between Unprotected Conduct and
Protected Speech

In addition to extending little or no protection for certain types
of speech, the Court also has distinguished between "pure speech"
and "speech plus conduct. ' 73 According to the Court, speech plus
conduct is entitled to less constitutional protection than pure speech
under the First Amendment. 74 The Supreme Court's development of
this issue is most clearly illustrated in the context of picketing cases.
In 1940, the Court held that peaceful picketing involving a labor
dispute was constitutionally protected free speech. 75 But in 1957, the
Court determined that picketing was more than speech because it
involved the physical presence of a picketing line. 76 The Court held
that the existence of this non-speech element, the physical presence
of the picketers, constituted speech plus conduct and, therefore,
subjected picketing to regulation. 77 The Court supported this reasoning
in a subsequent non-picketing case which held that the First

71. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986)
(holding that a private figure plaintiff must prove falsity of statement to recover
damages for defamation); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (holding that a private figure plaintiff may recover presumed
and punitive damages if speech is a matter of private concern); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding that states cannot impose strict
liability for defamation of private individual); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that a public figure plaintiff must show actual
malice in order to recover for defamation).
72. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
protection than other classes of protected speech); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (holding
that commercial speech is not without some First Amendment protection).
73. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965). The term speech plus conduct
refers to the combination of speech and nonspeech elements in the same course
of action.
74. Id.
75. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (invalidating a state law
prohibiting all union picketing).
76. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S.
284, 289 (1957) (quoting Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S.
769, 776 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring)) (upholding a state law prohibiting peaceful
labor picketing for illegal purposes).
77. Id. at 289 (stating that even peaceful picketing involves more than mere
communication of ideas and, thus, is not immune from state regulation).
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Amendment affords pure speech more protection than speech plus

conduct.78
Consequently, the Court has stated that the First Amendment
does not provide the same level of protection to ideas expressed by
conduct as it does to ideas expressed by words. 79 Moreover, the
Court has recognized that it has never been a violation of the freedom
of speech to make an act illegal merely because the act was initiated,
evidenced, or carried out through speech.8 0 One type of potentially
expressive conduct, of particular relevance to the Mitchell holding,
that has received no First Amendment protection is violence."1 Other
forms of expression that have been held to be unprotected conduct

include a demonstration on the premises of a county jail
83

burning of a draft card.

2

and the

Conversely, the Court has held that holding

a silent demonstration in a public library

4

and attaching a peace

5

symbol to an American flag constitute protected speech. As a result
of this persistent yet problematic distinction between conduct and
speech,8 6 courts are faced with the issue of determining at what

78. Cox, 379 U.S. at 555. On the steps of a courthouse, 2000 students participated
in a demonstration protesting segregation. Id.
79. Id. (rejecting the argument that the First Amendment affords the same kind
of protection to those who communicate ideas by conduct as to those who communicate ideas by "pure speech").
80. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (upholding
a state prohibition on picketing).
81. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (explaining
that violence produces unique harms apart from any communicative effect and
therefore receives no constitutional protection); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) (stating that violence is not protected by the First
Amendment).
82. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 42 (1966) (upholding a Florida trespass
statute).
83. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 367-77 (1968) (upholding federal
law prohibiting desecration of draft cards).
84. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966) (reversing a Louisiana
breach of the peace conviction).
85. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974) (invalidating flag misuse
statute).
86. There has been much scholarly material written on the speech/conduct
dichotomy which mainly contends that there is no meaningful distinction between
speech and conduct. See, e.g., TRIBE & TYLER, supra note 58, § 12.2. Tribe states
that "expressive behavior is '100%'o action and 100% expression,' " therefore, almost
all communication involves conduct, hence, much conduct is expressive. Tribe also
notes that the Court has never articulated a basis for its distinction between conduct
and speech, it simply reaches a conclusion; thus, there is no analytical process used
to reach the conclusion that the communication is either conduct or speech. TRIBE
& TYLER, supra note 58, § 12-7; see also Frederick M. Lawrence, Resolving the
Hate Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox.: Punishing Bias Crimes and Protecting Racist
Speech, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 673, 691 (1993). Lawrence also suggests that
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point conduct becomes expression protected under the First
Amendment.
The threshold question involved when a court is faced with this
issue is whether the conduct may be classified as expressive
communication. 7 In Spence v. Washington,88 the Court held that

conduct amounts to expressive communication when (1) there is an
intent to convey a particular message, and (2) there is a likelihood
that the message will be understood by those who view it.89 However,
satisfaction of the Spence requirements does not automatically extend
First Amendment protection to the expressive communication at

issue. 90 In fact, the Court has absolutely rejected the view that
conduct can be labeled speech whenever the person intends to thereby
express an idea. 91

there is no meaningful distinction between conduct and speech because they are
inextricably bound together. Lawrence, supra, at 692. Lawrence states that the
speech/conduct dichotomy is weak because most conduct involves expression while
most expression involves conduct. For example, cross burning is 100%70 action directed
at a victim and 100% expression of "deeply felt racism." Lawrence, supra, at 694
(referring to R.A. V.). Lawrence also agrees that application of the distinction
between speech and conduct "requires a process that assumes its own conclusions."
Lawrence, supra, at 694.
87. Without some communicative element there is no First Amendment analysis
involved. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (stating that in order
for an activity to be considered expressive conduct within the scope of the First
Amendment, it must be "sufficiently imbued with elements of communication").
88. 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (striking down a flag misuse statute invoked against
a protester who affixed a peace symbol on the American flag and flew it from a
window).
89. Id. at 410-11. One problem that results from Spence is determining whether
or not a particular message is intended by the conduct at issue. Often the Court
simply announces its conclusion without any satisfactory explanation. See, e.g.,
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2460 (1991) (holding as expressive
conduct nude dancing and stating that it was "within the outer perimeters" of
First Ainendintiit protection); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (quoting
Spence, 418 U.S. at 409) (holding as expressive conduct burning an American flag
and stating that it was conduct " 'sufficiently imbued with elements of communication' "); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
505 (1969) (holding as expressive conduct wearing a black arm band to protest the
Vietnam War and merely stating that it was "closely akin to 'pure speech' ");
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 370-71 (1931) (holding as expressive conduct
the displaying of a red flag).
However, it is important to remember that when violent conduct is involved the
expression loses any First Amendment protection it may have had. See Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984); NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982).
90. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (stating that when the
conduct involves both speech and nonspeech elements, a "sufficiently important
governmental interest" in the regulation of the nonspeech element may justify
incidental limitation of free speech).
91. Id.
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Once it is determined that the conduct at issue is expressive
speech, courts must analyze the challenged regulation in light of the
First Amendment guarantee. If the regulation is aimed at the content
of the communication, it will likely be struck down as
unconstitutional. 92 For content-neutral regulation of expressive
conduct, the judicial standards for review are clearly set out in
United States v. O'Brien.93 According to O'Brien, a government
regulation aimed at conduct may place "incidental limitations" on
speech if (1) the conduct itself can be properly regulated, (2) the
regulation serves a substantial governmental interest, (3) the
government's interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech,
and (4) the limitations on free speech are no greater than necessary
to serve governmental interests.94 It is important to remember that
O'Brien only provides for constitutional scrutiny of laws which
regulate acts that fall within the scope of expressive conduct.
3. Overbreadth Application to Regulations of Speech
In addition to the invalidation of regulations of speech which
violate the content-neutrality rule, laws which regulate speech may
also be struck down on grounds of overbreadth. Those laws which
sweep so broadly in scope that they would prohibit both protected
and unprotected speech are void for being unconstitutionally
overbroad. 95 Therefore, to survive First Amendment scrutiny, laws
regulating speech must be carefully drafted so as not to infringe
upon protected freedoms.9 It is important to note, however, that

92. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime
Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 508-09 (1991).
93. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (upholding a conviction for burning a draft card).
94. Id. Assuming, arguendo, that violence is expressive conduct, O'Brien provides
a good argument for upholding penalty enhancement statutes as constitutional
because they facially meet the requirements of the test: (a) the conduct (violent
crime) is properly regulable; (b) substantial state interests unrelated to suppression
of free expression are advanced by the penalty enhancement statute ((i) preventing
detrimental effects on society and the individual; (ii) preventing retaliatory crimes);
(c) the state's interest (to address the perceived harms) is unrelated to the suppression
of free speech; and (d) the limitation of free speech (the possibility of chilled
speech) is no greater than necessary to serve the government's interests. For a more
thorough analysis of O'Brien and penalty enhancement statutes, see Grannis, supra
note 14, at 216-30; see also People v. Grupe, 532 N.Y.S.2d 815, 819-20 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 1988) (determining that New York's ethnic intimidation statute would
meet the O'Brien requirements).
95. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1972) (invalidating Georgia law
prohibiting the use of "opprobrious" words or abusive language).
96. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). Closely related to the overbreadth
doctrine is the idea that free speech rights may be suppressed by laws that sweep
too broadly in scope and, in effect, prohibit protected communication. Id. at 432-
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this doctrine has been somewhat limited by the requirement that the
overbreadth be substantial, particularly where conduct as well as
97
speech is affected.
Application of the overbreadth doctrine is clearly illustrated by
the holding in Lewis v. City of New Orleans.98 The Court in Lewis
invalidated a city ordinance which prohibited cursing, reviling, or
using obscene or opprobrious language toward an on-duty police
officer. 99 The Court held that the proscription of opprobrious language
was not limited to words which could be categorized within the
definition of fighting words, and, therefore, the law effectively
penalized all offensive speech including speech which may have been
protected by the First Amendment. I° 0
Underlying the overbreadth doctrine is the concern that chilled
speech will result from laws that prohibit both protected and
unprotected speech. 0 1 The Court prohibits such laws because of the
belief that this chilling effect will cause people to forego their free
speech rights and censor themselves for fear of future prosecution
under the regulation. 0 2
B.

Use of Speech to Prove Biased Motive and Punishment of
Acts Motivated by Bias

Clearly, the First Amendment does not guarantee absolute
protection of speech; 0 moreover, some speech, subject to the

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
415 U.S. 130 (1974).
Id. at 132.
Id. at 134.
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972).
,,-,
,
0. Id. (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611
There is much debate over whether or not bias crime laws impermissibly chill
speech. Gellman theorizes that because penalty enhancement laws punish thought,
the words uttered by a defendant must be used to prove motive, and that this
will result in self-censorship. Gellman, supra note 14, at 359-61. Gellman also states
that awareness of the fact that any books read, speeches attended, views remarked,
or prior associations could be used against you to prove biased motive would lead
to self-censorship of expression of ideas whenever there is the fear that your idea
is contrary to that of the majority. Gellman, supra note 14, at 359-61.
Another scholar reasons that chilled speech is "entirely unrealistic" because penalty
enhancement laws do not target a person who expresses biased beliefs, but rather
punish violent acts. Chang, supra note 14, at 468-69. "Experience suggests that
criminalizing theft does not chill statements coveting material possessions .... [Nor
does] criminalizing tax fraud ... deter statements criticizing increased taxes." Chang,
supra note 14, at 468-69 (footnote omitted).
103. See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
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applicable rules of evidence," ° 4 may be used against the speaker as
evidence in civil and criminal litigation.10 5 For example, prior
inconsistent statements and admissions are regularly admitted against
the speaker as proof in the case against him.' ° Acknowledging this,
the Court routinely allows evidentiary use of a defendant's speech
as proof of the offense charged in criminal cases. 0 7 In a civil context,
the Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins'08 also allowed evidentiary
use of speech when examining a Title VII"°9 discrimination claim." 0
When examining the application of evidentiary use of speech to
penalty enhancement laws, it is important to recognize that while
biased speech alone may not be punished, a defendant's speech may
be used as evidence to prove that his biased motive controlled the

selection of his victim."'
1. Punishment of Motive in Criminal Law
Criminal law routinely classifies crimes and punishment in
accordance with the motives or thoughts a defendant had when

104. The Federal Rules of Evidence, on which many states base their evidentiary
rules, directly address the chilled speech situation, particularly FED. R. EvID. 403.
Evidence of a defendant's views not directly related to the motivation for the
criminal act will have little probative value and will likely be prejudicial if the
views are contrary to popular sentiment. Thus, "a particularly stringent application"
of evidentiary rules will be required because the chilling of expression will be
intensified if the scope of admissible evidence is widened. Grannis, supra note 14,
at 230.
105. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Street v. New
York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947).
106. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(l)-(2).
107. Street, 394 U.S. at 594 (holding that use of defendant's speech to prove
an element of an offense would be sufficient to sustain a conviction); Haupt, 330
U.S. at 642 (allowing use of defendant's speech to prove treason).
108. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
109. Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee
"because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
110. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251-52 (holding that the employer's "stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that gender played a part" in the alleged
discrimination).
111. See State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 818-19 (Wis. 1992) (Abrahamson,
J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993). "[Tlhe
state cannot use evidence that the defendant has bigoted beliefs or has made bigoted
statements unrelated to the particular crime ....
The state must directly link the
defendant's bigotry to the invidiously discriminatory selection of the victim and to
the commission of the underlying crime." Id. However, some scholars believe that
use of speech in such a manner will have a chilling effect on free expression. See,
e.g., Gellman, supra note 14, at 360-61.

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:659

committing the crime." 2 Thus, criminal liability is customarily linked
with a defendant's thoughts, and this has never been viewed as
implicating, much less violating, a defendant's First Amendment
freedoms." 3 In addition, evidence of a defendant's motive is often
considered during the sentencing phase of a trial. 1 4 The Court has
recognized that sentencing judges have traditionally exercised wide
discretion in the sentencing process" 5 and may properly consider the
defendant's motive when determining the appropriate sentence to
impose." 6 Furthermore, the Court has acknowledged that the sentence
imposed for a particular crime should reflect the nature and seriousness
of the conduct involved.'
Recently, the Supreme Court examined the role of motive as
an aggravating circumstance in death penalty sentencing. In Dawson
v. Delaware,"' the Court held that a defendant's abstract beliefs
are not relevant during sentencing, but acknowledged that the
"Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of

112. Generally, crimes are treated differently on the basis of the defendant's
culpability; for example, murder can be intentional, reckless, negligent, or in selfdefense, and the offense charged accordingly corresponds to the level of culpability.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.04(b), 210.1-210.4 (1962).
113. See In re Joshua H., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291, 302 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993);
Chang, supra note 14, at 466.
114. See Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1098 (1992); Barclay v. Florida,
463 U.S. 939, 942-43 (1983).
115. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
[B]efore and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this
country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge
could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used
to assist in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed....

Id. at 246; see also Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2606 (1991) (recognizing
that a wide range of relevant material has always been available for the consideration
of sentencing judges); United States v.

Tucker, 404 U.S. 443,

446 (1i972) (ac-

knowledging that judges are allowed to -conduct a broad inquiry, largely unlimited
as to the type of information to be considered or the origin from which it comes).
116. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.6(b) (2d
ed. 1986). Although motive is not relevant to substantive criminal law, a defendant's
motives are very important at sentencing; if he was acting with bad motives he is
more likely to get a higher sentence than if he was acting with good motives. Id.
117. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987) (noting that historically in
criminal law there exists the idea that the more purposeful the criminal act, the
more serious the crime and, therefore, the greater justification for serious punishment); Payne, 111 S.Ct. at 2605 (assessing the Ifarm caused by the crime is an
important consideration in criminal law for establishing the elements of the offense
and in fixing appropriate penalties); U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES
MANUAL (Nov. 1993). The introductory comment to chapter five of the federal
sentencing guidelines states that sentencing judges should consider the character
and seriousness of the crime when determining the appropriate sentence.
118. 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1098 (1992).
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evidence concerning one's beliefs and associations at sentencing simply
because those beliefs and associations are protected by the First
Amendment." 11 9 This view was previously espoused in Barclay v.
Florida, 20 where the Court held that a defendant's racial animus is
properly considered during sentencing when it is relevant to the

offense committed .121
Therefore, although irrelevant and abstract beliefs may not be
considered, evidence of a defendant's motive is admissible during
122
sentencing as long as it is sufficiently related to the crime charged.
Penalty enhancement laws similarly involve the use of relevant evidence
of a defendant's biased motive. 123 The pertinent evidence is used to
prove that the selection of the defendant's victim was motivated by
bias, and, therefore, the underlying crime is subject to penalty
24
enhancement. 1
2.

Punishment of Bias Motivated Acts in Civil Antidiscrimination Laws

Anti-discrimination laws prohibit bias-motivated conduct; that
is, actions performed because of a person's race, religion, gender,
disability, or other protected status. For example, an employer is
usually free to hire and fire whomever he pleases for whatever
reasons, but under Title VII, an employer is prohibited from firing,
refusing to hire, or otherwise discriminating against another on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.2 5 Employers
are likewise prohibited from discriminating against an individual
because of age or disability. 126 Although these acts could arguably
be considered expressive conduct, bias-motivated acts of discrimination

119. Id. at 1097 (holding that the sentencing judge improperly considered the
defendant's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood because it was not related to
the defendant's murder of a white victim).
120. 463 U.S. 939 (1983).
121. Id. at 949 (holding that the sentencing judge properly considered the defendant's membership in the Black Liberation Army in finding that "racial hatred"
motivated the defendant's murder of a white victim).
122. Id.
123. See State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 818-19 (Wis. 1992) (Abrahamson,
J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
124. Id.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988).
126. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988
& Supp. IV 1992); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(Supp. IV 1992).
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receive no constitutional protection. 127 Consequently, the Court has
upheld the constitutionality of anti-discrimination laws, such as Title
VII, against First Amendment attack.121
The relationship between civil anti-discrimination laws and antibias crime legislation is a subject which had received little attention
by the Supreme Court prior to Wisconsin v. Mitchell.2 9 The state
courts that addressed this issue before the Mitchell decision were in

conflict. 30 Courts that upheld penalty enhancement laws found that
civil anti-discrimination legislation was indistinguishable. 3' These
courts concluded that both kinds of laws punish discriminatory
actions taken because of the victim's status, as opposed to punishing
protected speech. 3 2 Additionally, these courts held that motive was
relevant to determining whether the victim was intentionally selected
because of a particular status.' 33 Conversely, courts that invalidated
penalty enhancement laws found that the role of motive in anti-

127. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) ("[Alcts of
invidious discrimination . .. cause unique evils that [the] government has a compelling interest to prevent-wholly apart from the point of view such conduct may
transmit."); Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (quoting Norwood
v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973)) ("Invidious private discrimination ... has
never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections."); Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976).
128. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2546-47 (1992) (explaining
that when regulations are not aimed at conduct on the basis of its expressive
content, conduct is not protected from regulation simply because it expresses a
discriminatory philosophy or idea).
129. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993). The subject was briefly addressed in R.A.V., where
the majority recognized that anti-discrimination laws were examples of permissible
content-neutral regulation. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546-47. However, Justice White,
in his concurring opinion, noted that the reasoning of the majority would draw
into question the validity of anti-discrimination laws like Title VII. Id. at 2557-58
(White, J., concurring).

130. See In re Joshua H., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (upholding
California penalty enhancement law); People v. Miccio, 589 N.Y.S.2d 762 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 1992) (upholding New York penalty enhancement law); Dobbins v. State,
605 So. 2d 922 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding Florida penalty enhancement
law). But see State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 1992) (invalidating Ohio ethnic
intimidation law that provided for penalty enhancement), vacated and remanded,
113 S. Ct. 2954 (1993); State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992) (invalidating
Wisconsin penalty enhancement law), rev'd sub nom. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113
S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
131. See Joshua, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 300; Miccio, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 765; Dobbins,
605 So. 2d at 925. Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court struck down its penalty
enhancement law, Justice Bablitch in his dissent stated that both types of laws
involve discrimination, and both involve a victim" and action taken because of the
victim's status. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 820 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
132. See Joshua, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 300; Dobbins, 605 So. 2d at 924.
133. See Joshua, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 302; Dobbins, 605 So. 2d at 924.
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discrimination laws and penalty enhancement statutes was dissimilar. 13 4
These courts reasoned that penalty enhancement laws were
unconstitutional because they punish the protected, although biased,
thought or motive behind the criminal act, whereas civil antidiscrimination laws punish the objective act of discrimination.' 35
IV.

REASONING OF THE COURT IN WISCONSIN V. MITCHELL

36
In upholding the Wisconsin penalty enhancement provision,
the Supreme Court stated that conduct cannot be labeled speech
merely because a person intends to express an idea. 37 The Court
further noted that the First Amendment does not protect physical
assault as a form of expressive conduct. 3 s The Court also recognized

134. See Wyant, 597 N.E.2d at 456; Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 816-17.
135. See Wyant, 597 N.E.2d at 456 (stating that anti-discrimination laws punish
the discriminatory act, not the bigoted thoughts of the actor); Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d
at 816-17 (stating that anti-discrimination laws prohibit discriminatory acts, whereas
bias crime laws punish the subjective mental process of selection).
There has been much written on this subject in response to these divergent state
holdings. In support of the view that motive is consistently employed in both types
of laws, one commentator argues that the discriminatory thought motivating the
act is the very reason why civil discriminatory acts and criminal discriminatory
conduct are illegal. Note, Hate Is Not Speech: A Constitutional Defense of Penalty
Enhancement for Hate Crimes, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1314, 1324 (1993). In response
to the position that bias crime laws punish protected thought and anti-discrimination
laws punish acts, another commentator contends that the purpose underlying the
illegal act of intentionally discriminating against someone rather than an objective
act of discrimination is the essence of illegal discrimination. Chang, supra note
14, at 455. Chang also points out that penalty enhancement statutes punish the
decision to act, the culmination of thought and action, not merely a defendant's
mental process. Chang, supra note 14, at 455.
136. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993). The pertinent part of the
Wisconsin statute at the time of Mitchell's conviction provided that the penalties
for an underlying crime were increased if a person:
Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime is committed or
selects the property which is damaged or otherwise affected by the crime
... because of the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation,
national origin or ancestry of that person or the owner or occupant of
that property, whether or not the actor's belief or perception was correct.
Id. at 2197 n.l (quoting Wis. STAT. § 939.645 (1989-90)). Preliminarily, the Court
found that the Wisconsin Supreme Court's "assessment" of the penalty enhancement
provision was not binding because it only characterized the practical effect of the
law. Thus, the Court could form its own judgment as to its operative effect. Id.
at 2198-99.
137. Id. at 2199 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968));
see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563 (1965) (stating that certain forms of
conduct mixed with speech may be regulated or prohibited), reh'g denied, 380 U.S.
926 (1965).
138. 113 S. Ct. at 2199 (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 469 U.S. 609,
628 (1984)).

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:659

that the sentencing process has historically been allowed wide latitude
to consider a broad range of factors. 3 9 Additionally, the Court
stated that motive has always been an important factor among the
many considered when sentencing judges are determining the ap40
propriate sentence.
The Court acknowledged that a defendant's abstract beliefs
which are in no way related to the offense may not be considered
at sentencing.' 4' However, the Court stated that there is no per se
barrier to considering beliefs and associations which would otherwise
be protected by the First Amendment. 42 The Court dismissed Mitchell's argument that Barclay 43 and Dawson'" were inapposite 45 and
stated that the decision of whether to impose the death sentence
was the most severe type of penalty enhancement.'4
The Court rejected Mitchell's principal argument that considering
discriminatory motive is unconstitutional because it punishes protected thought. 47 When analogizing the role of motive in penalty
enhancement provisions to the role of motive in anti-discrimination
laws, 1 8 the Court recognized that both types of laws prohibit discrimination against persons because of their protected status. 49 The
Court also cited Title VII and other civil rights statutes'50 as examples
5
of "permissible content-neutral regulation of conduct."' '
Next, the Court distinguished R.A. V. and concluded that it was
not controlling precedent. 5 2 The Court stated that R.A. V. involved
an unconstitutionally content-based regulation of fighting words which

139. Id. (citing Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2605 (1991); United States
v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246

(1949)).
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id. at 2200 (citing Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1098 (1992)).
Id. (quoting Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1094).
Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983), reh'g denied, 464 U.S. 874 (1983).

144. Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S.Ct. 1093 (1992).
145. 113 S.Ct. at 2200. Mitchell argued that the reasoning of Barclay and
Dawson was inapplicable because they were capital sentencing cases, not penalty
enhancement cases. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2200-01.
148. Id. at 2200 ("[Mjotive plays the same role under the Wisconsin statute as
it does under federal and state antidiscrimination laws, which we have previously

upheld against constitutional challenge.").
149.
150.
U.S.C.
151.
152.

Id.
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988);
§§ 1981-1982 (1988)).
Id.
Id. ("Nothing in . .. R.A.V. compels a different result here.").
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was directly aimed at expression, 5 ' but the Wisconsin penalty enhancement provision targeted unprotected conduct. 5 4 The Court also
acknowledged that some crimes traditionally receive greater penalties
because of their detrimental effect on society.'" The Court recognized
that the Wisconsin statute enhances punishment for bias-motivated
crimes because the Wisconsin legislature believes such crimes to inflict
5 6
great individual and societal harm.
Finally, the Court dismissed Mitchell's overbreadth argument,
stating that the alleged chilling effect was too speculative to support
his claim.' 57 The Court further noted that the First Amendment does
not bar evidentiary use of a defendant's speech to prove motive or
intent. 5 8 Consequently, the Court reversed and remanded the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision, upholding the Wisconsin penalty
enhancement law against Mitchell's First Amendment challenges. 5 9
V.

SIGNIFICANCE

The Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell makes it clear that
violence will not be classified as expressive conduct and, therefore,
will not receive First Amendment protection. 60 Although the Wisconsin penalty enhancement provision was clearly aimed at conduct,
including violent and non-violent criminal acts, the Court did not
address the constitutionality of a situation involving the penalty

153. Id. at 2200-01.

154. Id.
155. Id. " '[lIt is but reasonable that among crimes of different natures those
should be most severely punished, which are the most destructive of the public
safety and happiness.' " Id. at 2201 (quoting 4 WMLLM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
"16).

156. Id. at 2201. The Court also recognized that the determination of the level
of punishment for criminal offenses lies within the discretion of the legislature.
Id. at 2000 (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980); Gore v. United
States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958)).
157. Id. at 2201. The Court concluded that:
[t]he sort of chill envisioned here is far more attenuated and unlikely than
that contemplated in traditional 'overbreadth' cases ....

[W]e are left ...

with the prospect of a citizen suppressing his bigoted beliefs for fear that
evidence . . . will be introduced against him at trial if he commits a ...
serious offense against person or property.
Id.
158. Id. at 2201-02 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251-52
(1989)) (quoting Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 642 (1947)).
159. Id. at 2202.
160. Even though an O'Brien analysis would likely have resulted in upholding
the penalty enhancement provision, see supra note 94 and accompanying text, the
Court's failure to apply O'Brien strengthens its holding that violence is not expressive
conduct.
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enhancement of a non-violent crime. For example, it is unclear
whether the Mitchell holding includes within its scope the vandalism
of a black person's home by a white person who spray paints racial
epithets on the walls of the house. However, under Mitchell, it
seems unlikely that the Court will allow any criminal act to be
elevated to the level of constitutionally protected expressive con16
duct. '

Besides the legal significance of this holding, there are two
practical concerns that must be addressed. First, the probability of
chilled speech resulting from such laws appears more than hypothetical. While the Court called it too speculative, self-censorship
of one's beliefs for fear that they may be used to enhance a sentence
if convicted of a crime seems to be a real danger. Although penalty
enhancement laws facially target conduct, there is no doubt that
they also indirectly affect speech. Second, there is the concern that
penalty enhancement laws may be disproportionately enforced against
the very groups they were originally designed to protect-minorities.
Specifically, there have been reports that the current rise in bias
62
crime rates is due to racially motivated black offenders.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Many states have recognized that bias motivated crimes cause
specific harms to society. In an effort to address this problem, states
have enacted various forms of anti-bias crime legislation. 63 In R.A. V.,
the Supreme Court invalidated Minnesota's bias crime law for violating the First Amendment.'" This ruling appeared to threaten the
validity of many state laws aimed at punishing bias motivated acts.
In Mitchell, the Court resolved the First Amendment issues concerning penalty enhancement for bias crimes. The Court clarified

161. Unrelated to penalty enhancement but analogous to this situation is the
newly passed federal law which prohibits the use of force, or threat of force, to
intimidate or injure any person who seeks access to abortion related facilities. (See
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108
Stat. 694 (1994)). Clearly, individuals have every right to protest abortion because
they believe it is morally wrong. However, it would be ludicrous to allow them
to claim that their conduct is protected expression when they commit a criminal
act against an abortion clinic or its workers in furtherance of their beliefs.
162. Hate Crime by Blacks Rising, Group Says, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1993, at
A14. Klanwatch Project reports that violence by blacks against whites, Asians, and
Hispanics is escalating at an alarming rate and that blacks committed or were
arrested for 41 percent of all racially motivated murders committed in the United
States in 1993. fd.
163. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
164. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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its holding in R.A. V. and explained that the law at issue in R.A. V.
was struck down in violation of the First Amendment because it
punished a defendant's protected speech. 16 The penalty enhancement
provision in Mitchell, however, was upheld because it punished
unprotected conduct, not protected speech.'" Therefore, penalty enhancement laws that are similar to the Wisconsin statute are constitutional. As a result, states that have not yet enacted such a
provision now have a constitutional model to follow when drafting
their own bias crime laws.
Tamara L. Hamilton

165. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2200-01 (1993).
166. Id. at 2200.

